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Chapter at a glance
– The chapter gives an overview of the existing 
electric power system, the envisaged develop-
ment of smart grids, and the regulatory environ-
ment in China. The main aspects emphasized in 
this chapter serve as a guideline for the descrip-
tion of the German background in ▶ Chap. 4 and 
the recommendations and regulatory pathways in 
▶ Chaps. 5 and 6.
– ▶ Section 3.1 gives an overview of the more recent 
development of the power sector to lay a solid 
foundation for identifying the challenges currently 
facing the sector.
– ▶ Section 3.2 presents an overview of the physical 
structure of China’s current electric power system 
and discusses in detail the main technological 
challenges in this context.
– ▶ Section 3.3 introduces the Chinese smart grid vi-
sion resulting from the specific technological chal-
lenges. In this respect, the role of the government 
and the ICT industry in developing the Chinese 
smart grid vision is especially emphasized. 
– ▶ Section 3.4 describes the regulatory framework 
of the electric power system in China on the basis 
of the regulatory areas defined in ▶ Sect. 2.3. A 
clear focus is thereby on regulatory circumstances 
representing a barrier to smart grid development 
in China.
3.1 Historical perspective
Towards a reform of the power sector In the past 
15 years, a series of reforms have greatly improved 
the efficiency, reliability, and environmental perfor-
mance of the Chinese power sector. However, sig-
nificant challenges remain: rapidly rising electricity 
demand, concerns about power system reliability 
and energy security, environmental degradation 
and climate change [1].
Historically, all stages of China’s power sector 
value chain – from generation, transmission and 
distribution to retail – were owned and operated di-
rectly by the central government. By the mid-1980 s, 
in the wake of China’s opening up policy, a first set 
of reforms allowed new market actors, mostly pro-
vincial and local governments, to invest in power 
generation. This created a boom of so-called inde-
pendent power producers (IPP), thereby alleviating 
power shortages. Today, IPP make up more than 
half of China’s power generation assets. 
In 1997, the former Ministry of Electric Power 
(MoEP) was dissolved and the generation, transmis-
sion and distribution assets previously under direct 
government control were transferred to the newly 
formed State Electric Power Corporation (SEPC). 
This marked a significant step towards the separa-
tion of market functions fulfilled by state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and government regulatory au-
thority.
In 2002, the State Council of the People’s Repub-
lic of China promulgated a landmark reform for re-
structuring the Chinese power sector by separating 
power generation from grid operation (transmission 
& distribution). In the course of the reorganization, 
the vertically integrated SEPC was dismantled and its 
assets divided into eleven new SOE: two grid opera-
tors, five power generation companies, also known 
as Big Five (China Huaneng Group, China Datang 
Corporation, China Huadian Group, China Guodian 
Corporation, China Power Investment Corpora-
tion), and four power service companies providing 
advisory and ancillary services. At the same time, 
the State Council established a ministerial regulatory 
authority, the State Electricity Regulatory Commis-
sion (SERC), to oversee the developing competitive 
market structure and further push power sector lib-
eralization and market-based reform. The aim of this 
major power sector reform was to:- break-up the power sector monopoly and introduce fair competition (mainly on the 
generation side) within the framework set by 
the regulator,- improve economic efficiency and reduce costs,- rationalize the electricity tariff system and optimize resource allocation,- promote the development of the power indus-try and push ahead nationwide interconnec-
tion,- set up an open, orderly and well- developed power market based upon the principles of 
separation of governmental oversight and 
power sector enterprises.
In retrospect, the reforms are considered a sig-
nificant step towards the diversification of Chi-
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na’s power sector market structure. However, the 
market-oriented reform of the power sector – as it 
had originally been envisaged by the State Coun-
cil – stalled after these initial steps. No progress 
was made in unbundling the grid operators’ trans-
mission and distribution assets or in introducing 
more market-based electricity prices. This lack of 
progress despite ambitious plans for further re-
forms may be attributed in part to a lack of power 
and independent decision-making authority of 
the newly established regulator SERC, which suf-
fered from very limited jurisdiction, capacity and 
resources. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) is a successor to the State 
Planning Commission (SPC), which was renamed 
to State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) 
in 1998. In March 2003 the SDPC merged with the 
State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic 
System and parts of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission to form NDRC, which remained the 
most powerful policymaker for the power sector, 
retaining competence over electricity pricing and 
major energy project approval. The emergence of 
the newly formed State Grid Corporation of China 
(SGCC, in charge of 80 % of China’s electricity 
grid) as a powerful influence in national energy 
policies further hampered the stride towards liber-
alization of the sector. In the most recent govern-
ment restructuring in March 2013, the SERC was 
integrated into the National Energy Administration 
(NEA), an institution responsible for energy plan-
ning under the NDRC.
The trend towards low carbon development For 
a long time, progress in the electrification process 
together with the provision of a reliable and afford-
able power supply were the main priorities of Chi-
na’s government in its efforts to promote industrial 
and economic development. In the last two decades, 
questions relating to the sustainability of the electric 
power system have steadily gained increasing im-
portance in China.
Energy efficiency and environmental protec-
tion were first put forward as a prominent policy 
objective for power sector development in China’s 
general energy law – the 1995 Electric Power Law 
[2]. On the one hand, the law aimed at legalizing 
the status of power generation companies as com-
mercial entities and at establishing the legal basis 
for private ownership [3]. On the other hand, the 
law stressed the importance of the environmental 
sustainability of the development of the power sys-
tem by stipulating that
» the construction, production, supply and utiliza-
tion of electric power shall protect the environ-
ment according to law, adopt new technologies, 
minimize discharge of poisonous waste, and pre-
vent pollution and other public hazards. The state 
encourages and supports electricity generation by 
using renewable and clean energy resources. [4]
The shift towards environmental protection was re-
iterated in the 1998 Energy Conservation Law and 
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law, which respectively 
aim at promoting energy efficiency and deploying 
RES. The Renewable Energy Law has laid a solid 
legal foundation that has since been followed by a 
number of key implementation guidelines detail-
ing national renewable energy targets, a mandatory 
connection and purchase policy, a national feed-in 
tariff system for wind and solar energy as well as 
arrangements for cost-sharing and funding of re-
newable energy incentives.
China put forward aggressive measures to re-
duce the energy intensity of its economy: in its 11th 
(2006–2010) Five-Year plan, China set a target of re-
ducing its energy intensity, measured as energy con-
sumption per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), 
by 20 %. At the world climate conference in Copen-
hagen in 2009, China complemented this target with 
an overarching goal to reduce carbon intensity, the 
measure of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
GDP, by 40 % to 45 % by 2020 compared to 2005 
levels. The targets are backed up by comprehensive 
plans featuring numerous measures to facilitate in-
creased energy efficiency and reduced emissions 
across different sectors. One of these efforts is the 
Small Plant Closure Program established in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. It focused on closing down small 
and inefficient power plants and replacing them 
with larger state-of-the-art facilities. In the period 
from 2006 to 2010, more than 70 GW of coal-fired 
power generation capacity was shut down in the 
context of this program [5]. The program not only 
targeted power plants, but also facilitated the shut-
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down and replacement of a large number of out-
dated small factories of energy-intensive industries, 
e. g. in the iron and steel and cement sectors. More 
recently, small coal mines and inefficient pulp and 
paper mills have been subject to this government 
policy promoting consolidation and modernization 
of its heavy industry.
The Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Saving Program 
was another measure of the 11th Five-Year Plan to 
improve industrial energy efficiency by targeting 
China’s largest energy consuming companies, which 
accounted for almost half of total industrial energy 
consumption and one third of total primary energy 
consumption in China. The program reportedly re-
alized total energy savings of 150 million tons of 
coal equivalent, 50 % more than originally planned 
[6]. The ambitious targets and extensive efforts to 
promote energy efficiency and adjust China’s energy 
mix through the deployment of renewable energies 
are evidence of China’s commitment to decouple its 
economic growth from the growth of energy de-
mand and emissions – to reduce the carbon inten-
sity of its economy and fight pollution.
An increasing factor influencing China’s energy 
and industrial policy is the increasing public aware-
ness of environmental pollution and its detrimental 
effects on the ecosystem and on people’s health. In 
particular, the extreme levels of air pollution in ma-
jor Chinese cities may be seen as a potential source 
of social unrest and has thus been given great at-
tention by the Chinese government, especially after 
the serious pollution events in Beijing in January 
2013 saw particulate matter air pollution levels rise 
to figures exceeding the 24-hour mean level recom-
mended by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
by more than 30 times.
3.2 Today’s power system and 
its most pressing challenges
3.2.1 Power generation
Compared to international averages, China’s per 
capita reserves of coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
are rather low, a situation which in recent years has 
resulted in an increasing dependence on the import 
of fossil fuels [7]. In contrast, China is endowed 
with large renewable energy resources – estimated 
at 250 GW and 750 GW for onshore and offshore 
wind respectively, plus significant solar energy re-
sources [8]. Since the 1980 s, China’s power gen-
eration capacity has been steadily expanding (see 
. Fig. 3.1). From 2006 to 2012, total installed ca-
pacity almost doubled, increasing from 621 GW to 
1,147 GW [9].
Coal is currently the primary source of elec-





































 . Fig. 3.1 China’s power generation capacities from 1980 to 2012, data from [10]
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for close to 80 % of total electricity generation [9]. 
This massive reliance on coal for power generation 
and industry makes China the biggest CO2 emitter 
worldwide [11]. The second pillar of China’s elec-
tricity generation mix is hydro power, which has 
a share of roughly 17 % of total electricity genera-
tion. Nuclear and wind power contribute a share of 
roughly 2 % each. Other sources, such as gas, solar, 
and biomass power, with shares of less than 1 % 
each, currently play no more than a minor part in 
China’s power mix [9]. 
Although China’s generation mix has been rela-
tively stable over the past two decades, the compo-
sition of the country’s coal-fired power plants has 
undergone a significant shift toward larger and more 
efficient units, especially during the 11th Five-Year 
Plan. By implementing the policy of replacing small-
size units by large and efficient plants, the share of 
units with 300 MW and above rose from 42.67 % of 
total thermal generating capacity in 2000 to 89.1 % 
by the end of 2010. As a result, the standard coal 
consumption per kWh generated has been reduced 
significantly (see . Fig. 3.2).
With the introduction of the Renewable Energy 
Law in 2006, China triggered a boom in the expan-
sion of renewable energy development (. Fig. 3.3). 
China has since become the world’s largest pro-
ducer of wind power, with approximately 13 GW 
installed in 2012 reaching a total installed and grid-
connected capacity of 61.4 GW. With the introduc-
tion of financially attractive feed-in-tariffs in 2013, 
China has also recently become the world’s biggest 
market for solar PV with record installations of 
around 14 GW, more than 11 GW of which is grid-
connected [9].
China’s electricity system, however, is not well-
prepared for such a rapid increase of intermittent 
wind and solar generation units. Due to the lack of 
gas-fired power plants in China, coal-fired power 
plants are mainly employed for load-following and 
peak generation. These activities require a signifi-
cant cycling reducing the operational efficiency of 
coal-fired power plants [12]. Also, limited inter-
regional transmission capacities often complicate 
the usage of hydro power plants for load-following 
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 . Fig. 3.2 Standard coal consumption (2002–2012), data from [10]
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integration costs for wind and PV power in China 
[12].
Another challenge of the rapid build-up of re-
newables is that grid connection is lagging behind. 
Wind turbines are erected much faster than power 
lines are built. Realizing this problem, the govern-
ment has made efforts to slow wind power expan-
sion in order to reduce the share of wind power 
capacity which is installed but not grid-connected 
(by year-end) from 30 to 20 % in 2012. Due to the 
heavy concentration of wind power in remote re-
gions with rich wind resources and in so-called 
wind power bases with 10 GW and more capacity, 
curtailment due to grid congestion has become an 
important issue: 20 TWh of wind power had to be 
curtailed in 2012 [13], representing about 20 % of 
total electricity generation from wind [14]. Since fi-
nancial losses due to curtailment are not reimbursed 
to RES owners, wind power developers exposed to 
the negative impact of curtailment are increasingly 
building wind farms in lower wind speed regions 
with less network congestions. 
Challenges in China’s power generation 
sector- China is not particularly well endowed with fossil energy resources in per capita terms. 
A system relying on fossil-fueled generators 
may create an increasing dependence on 
foreign energy sources. - China’s heavy reliance on coal for power generation and industrial processes is 
contributing to high air pollution levels and 
CO2 emissions.- Employing coal-fired power plants for load-following and peak generation reduces the 
efficiency of their operation.- Renewable energy deployment is poorly coordinated with grid development, so 
that grid connection is lagging behind the 
construction of renewable power plants and 
significant quantities of wind power are be-
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 . Fig. 3.3 Installed capacities of renewable energies (2005–2012), data from [10]
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- The high proportion of large coal-fired power plants and lack of gas-fired genera-
tors makes the Chinese power system less 
flexible. At the same time, an increasing 
share of electricity generated from intermit-
tent renewable energy is increasing the 
demand for system flexibility.
3.2.2 Power consumption
Since the 1980 s, the increase in China’s power 
consumption has been mainly driven by industrial 
growth. In 2011, more than 70 % of China’s electric-
ity was consumed by the industrial sector [15]. The 
residential sector accounted for approximately 12 % 
and the commercial sector for 3 % (see . Table A.1 
in the appendix). One reason for the high propor-
tion of industrial loads in China is the focus on 
producing and exporting energy-intensive materi-
als and goods [7]. While it is still relatively high in 
comparison to countries with a focus on less energy-
intensive sectors [16], China’s overall energy inten-
sity of production (defined as energy consumption 
per unit of GDP) has been decreasing consistently 
due to a number of government measures to pro-
mote energy efficiency (see . Fig. 3.4).
China’s economy is gradually shifting away from 
heavy industry towards high value-added industries, 
such as information technologies and the service sec-
tor [12]. The composition of the electricity consump-
tion is projected to change in the coming decades. 
Shares of residential and commercial electricity con-
sumption are expected to increase. As a consequence, 
a predicted increase in load variability and range of 
fluctuation will soon require a higher flexibility of 
electric power generation [12]. In addition, industrial 
demand for reliable and high-quality electricity is ex-
pected to increase due to the growing importance 
of information technology in all economic sectors.
Challenges in China’s power consumption 
sector- The efficiency of energy and electricity use is low.  - Future energy demand from high value-added industries will require high power 











 . Fig. 3.4 Energy intensity per unit of GDP (1991–2011), data from [10]
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will be more variable in nature, thus requir-
ing a higher degree of flexibility in the 
Chinese power system.- There is a mismatch between the current power generation system with its limited 
flexibility and an increasing demand for 
flexible generation due to a projected shift 
in electricity consumption patterns towards 
more variability in demand.
3.2.3 Power logistics
Disparity between power generation and con-
sumption Coal supplies are mainly located in the 
northwestern, northern, and northeastern parts of 
China (sometimes referred to as “Three Norths”). 
Similarly, wind resources are concentrated in the 
three northern regions as well as along China’s coast. 
Solar energy resources are abundant in the west and 
north of China. Hydro power is concentrated in the 
southwest and in the upstream areas of the Yellow 
River. While energy resources are most abundant 
in China’s north and west, regions that are typically 
remote and less economically developed, the load is 
concentrated in the economic and industrial centers 
along China’s eastern coast. This discrepancy pres-
ents a major challenge for power logistics (transmis-
sion) as well as for the physical transportation of 
fossil resources and puts a heavy strain on power 
grid and road/railway infrastructure.
Grid infrastructure The regional disparity between 
energy resource distribution and load profile on the 
one hand and between the geographical location of 
electricity generation facilities and major centers 
of consumption on the other means that electricity 
has to be transported from north to south and from 
west to east. However, China does not have a na-
tionally integrated electricity network. Its network 
is fragmented into six regional grids with limited 
interconnection operated by three grid companies: 
SGCC, China Southern Power Grid (CSG) and the 
Inner Mongolia Grid Company (for a more compre-
hensive overview of China’s power lines please refer 
to . Table A.2 in the appendix).
Aside from the limited capacity of interconnec-
tors between the regional networks, interregional 
electricity trade is also heavily impeded by ad-
ministrative barriers. Regional grids are made up 
of provincial grids, where dispatch decisions are 
made with the aim of balancing supply and demand 
within the boundaries. For cross-border power trad-
ing, provinces have to conclude bilateral contracts 
specifying the annual amount of electricity trans-
mitted in each direction typically netting close to 
zero [17]. This way of restricting interregional trade 
makes it difficult to leverage the power system’s in-
herent flexibility potential across regional borders, 
e. g. the use of dispatchable hydro power capacities 
for peak generation and ancillary services in other 
regions [12]. 
Around the turn of the century, in an effort to 
speed up nationwide grid integration and to con-
nect regions with significant hydro power, solar, and 
wind capacities with the load centers on the east 
coast, China started to construct Ultra High Voltage 
(UHV) power transmission lines. Today, China is 
considered a global leader in UHV transmission and 
transformation technology [18]. Specifically, UHV 
alternating current (AC) lines are used for transmit-
ting electricity generated in coal-fired power plants 
or by means of RES from China’s northern and west-
ern regions to the load centers. UHV direct current 
(DC) lines are used for transmitting hydro power 
from South and Central China to the east coast.
Asset utilization and supply security Compared 
to other countries, for instance the United States, 
average utilization rates of the grid infrastructure 
in China are low in spite of the rather flat load 
curve [19]. Major transmission lines, for example, 
seldom reach a high utilization rate. In 2011, for in-
stance, two 800-kV lines for which data are available 
reached utilization rates of less than 35 %. Only five 
of eleven trans-regional lines with 500- and 660-kV 
achieved utilization rates above 50 % [20]. At the 
level of distribution grids, average utilization rates 
of 10-kV lines and transformers are even lower and 
only seldom reach values above 30 % [19]. 
In principle, low utilization rates point to a large 
margin for grid operation often resulting in a high 
level of system stability and security. In the specific 
case of China, average annual outage times of urban 
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users during the last years exceeded seven hours (see 
. Table A.3 in the appendix) and those of rural users 
even ten hours [19]. In Germany, to give a reference 
value from an industrialized country, average an-
nual outage times were only approximately 15 min-
utes in 2010. This evidence points to low levels of 
equipment maturity in parts of the electric power 
grid (see also [21], [22]). In recent years, invest-
ments in distribution grids have been considerably 
smaller than those in transmission grids [12]. Most 
line losses and power outages in China occur in the 
distribution grid [19] pointing to less sophisticated 
equipment in the distribution grid compared to the 
transmission grid (see also [21]). 
Investment needs in the grid infrastructure In the 
coming years, massive investments will have to be 
made in the electric power grid in order to cope 
with the steadily rising power consumption, in-
crease supply security, and facilitate the integration 
of wind and PV power. It is projected that, in 2020, 
the total length of power lines of 110 kV and above 
will reach 1.76 million kilometers with an associ-
ated transformer capacity of 7.9 billion kVA [23]. 
This represents a considerable increase compared to 
line length and transformer capacities in 2010 (see 
. Table A.2 in the appendix).
Challenges in China’s power logistics 
sector:- The regional disparity between power gen-eration and consumption in combination 
with barriers to interregional electricity ex-
change imposes a constraint on the efficient 
use and delivery of energy resources.- The barriers to interregional electricity exchange make it difficult to fully exploit the 
flexibility potential inherent in the power 
system.- Asset utilization rates of China’s electric power grids are below those of highly indus-
trialized countries such as the United States 
in spite of China’s rather flat load curve. - Supply security in China is considerably lower than in highly industrialized countries. 
There is evidence that a large part of power 
outages and line losses in China originate 
from distribution grids. This indicates that 
distribution grid equipment is less mature 
and sophisticated than transmission grid 
equipment. 
3.3 Smart grid development 
in China
3.3.1 Motivation for smart grids 
in China
Smart grids for increasing supply security A core 
motivation for smart grids in China is their sus-
pected positive impact on supply security. In China, 
especially distribution grids with voltage levels 
of 10-kV and less are limiting reliability for urban 
end-user’s, causing roughly 80 % of all power black-
outs [19]. Due to missing sensoring and monitoring 
technologies, it often takes a long time to analyze 
the respective line, locate and isolate the fault, and 
re-establish electricity supply [19]. 
Enhancing distribution grids with smart grid 
technologies such as advanced sensoring and con-
trol technologies is often seen as a means to improve 
the reliability of the whole electric power system in 
China (see e. g. [19]).
Smart grids for facilitating peak shaving The 
rapid growth of electricity consumption reflected 
in very high peak loads may cause shortages on 
the generation side and network congestions. 
Also, the rising importance of residential electric-
ity consumption compared to industrial electricity 
consumption will lead to a more pronounced load 
curve. This trend could be further accentuated by 
China’s continuing urbanization process [24]. With 
low gas generation capacities and limited transmis-
sion capacities, coal-fired power plants are mainly 
employed for load-following and peak generation 
in China. This reduces their operational efficiency. 
Peak shaving is of critical importance as it contrib-
utes to a reduction of peak loads and thus helps to 
avoid peak generation. Peak shaving might also re-
duce potential network congestions when demand 
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peaks occurring in periods of network congestions 
are reduced via demand side management. As such, 
it should be seen as an important factor towards a 
more reliable power system in China. In addition, 
by reducing the maximum grid load, peak shaving 
helps to increase average utilization rates of the grid 
infrastructure, thus reducing investment needs and 
increasing the affordability of electricity supply.
To enable peak shaving and demand side man-
agement it is necessary to deploy an ICT infrastruc-
ture for two-way communications between end-
users – or so-called prosumers if they also generate 
electricity – and grid operators. Together with other 
smart grid technologies facilitating real-time data ex-
change, visualization of information as well as control 
of devices, this infrastructure enables the grid opera-
tor to have a clear picture of electricity consumption 
and generation at any given time, while allowing end-
users to receive price signals to adapt their electricity 
consumption to the variable supply.
Smart grids for preparing extensive integration 
of RES China has aggressively expanded RES gen-
eration capacities within an extremely short time 
frame. Grid connection of RES is currently lagging 
behind and a considerable amount of RES-E is cur-
tailed. In this context, smart grid technologies are 
often seen as a means to reduce RES integration 
costs: - Large-capacity battery storage systems facili-tate the integration of centralized large-scale 
intermittent RES generation capacities of the 
type that are currently focused upon in China.1- Due to frequent network congestions at the lo-cal level, a considerable quantity of electricity 
generation from RES has to be curtailed. More 
effective grid capacity management using 
smart grid technologies could reduce curtail-
ment of RES.- Smart grid technologies such as microgrids and virtual power plants ease the integration of 
RES at the local level.
1 One example for the trend towards large-capacity battery 
storage are the activities of BYD. The Chinese manufacturer 
of automobiles and rechargeable batteries built one of the 
world’s largest lithium-ion battery energy storage systems, 
a 36-megawatt-hour system, located in Zhangbei, Hebei 
[52].
- The grid connection itself might be more effec-tive with smart grid technologies. One aspira-
tion expressed in this area is that RES might 
be integrated into grid operation via standard-
ized ICT connectors so that the integration of 
standard RES plants might become as easy as 
connecting external devices with computers 
via universal serial bus (USB) interfaces (plug-
and-play integration) [25].
3.3.2 China’s technological view 
of the smart grid
The development of smart grids in China An 
early form of smart grids was proposed in 1999 by 
Lu and Mei [26] in their article Basic research on 
vital scientific problem with collapse prevention and 
optimal operation of large scale power systems [27]. 
Five years later, distributed computing was applied 
in a research project for a real-time simulation of 
the entire power grid [27]. In 2007, the East China 
Grid Company, a subsidiary of SGCC, carried out a 
feasibility study on smart grids that examined the 
promotion of digital substations and build-up of a 
unified enterprise platform for power system data 
[27]. 
The grid operator’s view on smart grids Since 
then, China’s smart grid development has mainly 
been pushed forward by China’s grid operators, 
SGCC and CSG. In 2009, SGCC proposed the stra-
tegic goal of building strong and smart grids with 
Chinese characteristics. SGCC focuses on the na-
tionwide integration of provincial and regional grids 
by means of a strong UHV AC backbone. The first 
objective of this backbone grid is to ease the balanc-
ing and power exchange between different regions, 
the second to integrate large-scale generation from 
RES. CSG, on the other hand, envisages a smart 
grid with a more decentralized focus using pri-
marily high voltage direct current (HVDC) links as 
backbone systems. CSG intends to integrate remote 
energy sources, especially hydro power. HVDC 
development will lead to separated asynchronous 
provincial grids. The nationwide synchronization of 
China’s power grids is not one of CSG’s main goals. 
Comparing both strategies reveals that the two grid 
Chapter 3 • China’s way from conventional power grids towards smart grids28
operators pursue different approaches with regard 
to the type of transmission technology and the na-
tionwide synchronization of China’s power grids.
In spite of this disagreement, the smart grid vi-
sions of both grid operators concentrate mainly on 
the upgrade of transmission grids: a look at the total 
annual smart grid revenues from the most impor-
tant smart grid technologies in China reveals that 
currently more than 50 % of revenue is related to 
upgrades of transmission grids. Substation and dis-
tribution automation technologies are responsible 
for no more than a low share of overall smart grid 
revenues (see . Fig. 3.5). According to markets 
forecasts for 2020, the absolute increase in smart 
grid revenues related to transmission upgrades is 
significantly higher than the increases of revenues 
from substation automation, distribution automa-
tion, and AMI (see . Fig. 3.5).
The government’s view on smart grids China’s gov-
ernment has already acknowledged the importance 
of smart grids for China’s future energy system. In 
its  12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development, the People’s National Congress 
explicitly set the goal of accelerating smart grid de-
velopments in China (see [27]). In the Decision of the 
State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and De-
velopment of Strategic Emerging Industries, the State 
Council also underlined the importance of speeding 
up the development of smart grids (see [27]). 
In addition to the general commitment to smart 
grids, NEA also issued a general definition of smart 
grids:
» Smart grid technologies have the purpose to 
integrate new energy, materials and equipment 
as well as advanced technologies in information, 
automatic control and energy storage for realizing 
digital management, intelligent decision-making 
and interactive transaction in power generation, 
transmission, distribution, consumption and 
storage. Furthermore, smart grid assets optimize 
the resource allocation and satisfy diverse needs 
of customers as well as ensure the safety, reliability 
and cost-efficiency of power supply. Finally, the 
new technology [in the sense of smart technology] 
bridges the constraint of environmental protec-
tion and the development of the power market.
Moreover, the Chinese government supports the 
technological development of main smart grid 
technologies by means of innovation policies 
 . Fig. 3.5 Annual overall smart grid revenue of main smart grid technologies in China (© Navigant Research [28])
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such as standardization and R&D funding (see 
▶ Sect. 3.4.6). However, in contrast to both grid op-
erators, the Chinese government has not yet devel-
oped a perspective of its own on the technological 
and organizational design of China’s smart grids. As 
a result, the discussion of such aspects is still domi-
nated by the grid operators and there is currently 
no unanimously accepted comprehensive view of 
smart grids in China. 
This lack of common understanding among the 
main stakeholders is the cause of many controver-
sies and basic disagreements on the key aspects of 
smart grid development [27]. The absence of such a 
common vision increases uncertainty for potential 
smart grid investors because the profitability of their 
investments critically depends on whether a strong 
and smart or a decentralized smart grid will be real-
ized. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive smart grid 
vision has to be viewed as an obstacle towards the 
development of smart grids in China [27].
Main challenges with regard to the 
technological view of smart grids- Due to the contrary strategies of China’s grid operators on the subject of smart grid 
development and the absence of a Chinese 
government view on smart grids, there is 
still no unanimously accepted vision on the 
technological and organizational design 
of smart grids in China. As a result, there is 
much uncertainty among potential smart 
grid investors regarding the future develop-
ment. 
3.3.3 This study’s view on smart 
grids in China
The present study has a clear focus on proposing 
regulatory policies supporting the evolution of 
smart grids in China. The creation of a widely ac-
cepted technological smart grid vision is beyond 
the study’s scope. Nonetheless, a common under-
standing of desirable smart grid developments 
during the next years is necessary to determine the 
general direction of the regulatory recommenda-
tions. Given the missing unanimously accepted 
smart grid vision in China, a pragmatic three-sided 
approach was employed to develop such a common 
understanding:- Following a bottom-up approach, China’s future smart grid is considered to comprise a 
broad portfolio of ICT together with vari-
ous modern technologies for power genera-
tion, transmission, distribution, storage, and 
consumption.2 This also includes modern 
grid technologies such as UHV transmission 
grids or heat-resistant wires. A recent litera-
ture review supports this view by underlining 
that smart grids in China focus on all sections 
of the power system, including smart power 
generation, transmission, deployment, usage 
and storage. Specifically, the integration of RES 
should also be understood as part of the topic 
of smart grids in China [27].- The smartness of the current electric power grid as well as the desirable smartness of the 
power grid in 2020 was assessed. In particu-
lar, the current levels of system integration of 
single power system components as well as the 
projected levels in 2020 were described. In this 
context, system integration refers to the extent 
to which power plants, wind farms, trans-
mission grids, distribution grids, and power 
consumers are expected to be remotely moni-
torable, controllable, or even autonomously 
controllable (self-healing).3 - Given the government’s will to establish energy markets, the study compares market elements 
used in China today with those projected for 
2020.4
This three sided-approach has led to the following 
conclusions:- China has in recent years made important breakthroughs in the development of smart 
grid technologies. Examples for such technolo-
2 Please refer to appendix B for a complete overview of all 
modern technologies that are subsumed under the smart 
grid label in this study.
3 Please refer to appendix C for a complete overview of the 
results. 
4 Please refer to appendix C in for a complete overview of 
the results of this discussion.
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gies are UHV transmission grids and large-
capacity battery energy storage technology.5 - On the other hand, a big leap forward with regard to many smart grid technologies is 
indispensable at all stages of the smart grid 
supply chain.6 Like in many other countries 
engaged in the development of smart grids, 
some of China’s key smart grid technologies 
are still immature and have somewhat incon-
sistent component specifications and standards 
[21], [22], [27].- In 2020, market elements such as regional energy marketplaces and virtual power plants 
are intended to be used much more intensively 
than today. They will be introduced at least on 
provincial level. 
With the study’s focus on regulatory issues in mind 
and in light of the conclusions described above, the 
regulatory pathways presented in this study aim 
specifically at:- facilitating the widespread deployment in 2020 of those smart grid technologies which have 
already achieved high maturity levels today. 
In this context, smart grid technologies also 
include modern grid technologies which are 
not necessarily included in smart grid concepts 
of other countries;- promoting technological innovations of rather immature smart grid technologies and increase 
their maturity;- promoting the development of so-called smart markets (see ▶ Sect. 4.3.2 for more details on 
smart markets). In this context, an important 
prerequisite is the integration of third parties. 
They are seen as key players in smart markets. 
5 Please refer to appendix B for a complete list and descrip-
tion of these technologies. 
6 Please refer to appendix C for an overview of the necessary 
technological advancement during the next years.
3.4 The regulation of China’s 
electric power system
3.4.1 Policy setting and fundamental 
institutions
Policy Setting 
Government leadership is essential to promote 
smart grid development. The general strategy of 
policy-makers towards the development of the fu-
ture power system, often containing quite specific 
targets for short-term and long-term development, 
is important for companies and other stakeholders 
in the electric power sector: indeed, this govern-
ment strategy serves as an important basis for smart 
grid investment decisions of both companies and 
households. 
The Chinese government has set quite specific 
targets with regard to the development of the energy 
system until 2015. However, there are no explicit 
targets beyond this point in time. The most impor-
tant government targets for 2015 are briefly sum-
marized below:- From 2010 to 2015, generation and grid capacities are planned to increase by roughly 
50 % in order to cope with the steadily growing 
demand. - RES generation capacities are expected to increase out of proportion – their share in the 
electricity mix will increase significantly.- Average utilization rates of the grid infra-structure and supply security are targeted to 
increase. Specifically, power outages on the 
level of distribution grids, are expected to be 
reduced.- The efficiency of energy use and particularly of electricity use is planned to improve consider-
ably.
A detailed overview of government targets for 
China’s future electric power sector is given in 
▶ Sect. 6.1 in the context of the regulatory pathways. 
Fundamental institutions 
To realize the government agenda, ministries and 
other government institutions issue laws and ordi-
nances, monitor compliance with these laws and or-
dinances, propose major technological standards, 
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and promote innovations. The question regarding 
whether the different government practices can be 
executed effectively largely depends on the gover-
nance structure of ministries and government in-
stitutions.
Governance structure The governance structure of 
China’s energy system, and in particular the power 
sector, has been subject to frequent reorganization 
and currently comprises a broad variety of minis-
tries and institutions. The fragmentation of respon-
sibilities among a multiplicity of different stakehold-
ers makes conflicts of competence inevitable and a 
coherent and continuous governance of the power 
sector difficult [2].
. Figure 3.6 presents a graphical overview of 
the main authorities of China’s power sector gov-
ernance (. Table A.4 in the appendix further speci-
fies influences, roles, and responsibilities of main 
governmental institutions). There are four main 
government authorities involved in China’s power 
sector policy:- The State Council (SC) is the highest executive organ of the People’s Republic of China. With 
regard to the electricity sector it sets the politi-
cal agenda, takes the lead for major reforms 
and is in charge of promulgating major plans 
like the Five-Year Plan for energy develop-
ment.- The NDRC is an agency under SC exerting broad administrative and planning control 
over the Chinese economy. It is the most im-
portant government authority for power sector 
regulation. Its powers include the regulation 
and setting of energy and electricity prices, 
the approval of major power sector projects, as 
well as energy efficiency policy.- The NEA proposes the energy development strategy, drafts energy development plans as 
well as energy-related policies, provisions and 
laws to be adopted by NDRC or SC. NEA also 
advises on power system reform and market 
regulation. In addition to these political func-
tions, NEA is the regulatory authority for the 
power sector in charge of regulating power sys-
tem construction, power safety, power supply 
and service, as well as tariff and information 
disclosure.
- The State-owned Asset Supervision and Ad-ministration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) supervises the performance of SOE 
such as the grid operators and the major power 
generation companies. SASAC exerts its power 
through the right to appoint, dismiss and eval-
uate the performance of executives, the right to 
audit as well as to approve key decisions.
The existing literature on China’s governance struc-
ture in the electric power sector (see for example 
[2], [3], and [30]) often stresses several regulatory 
challenges potentially preventing an effective devel-
opment towards smart grids in China: - There is a significant fragmentation as well as overlap of responsibilities of the various 
government bodies involved in power system 
regulation, negatively affecting the efficiency of 
the sector’s governance.- In international comparison, China’s major institutions governing the energy sector have a 
rather low number of employees, staff numbers 
not always being adequate to fulfill the respon-
sibility of regulating an electricity system the 
size of China.- The importance of the previous aspect even in-creases when the size and the power of China’s 
major grid operators are taken into account. 
The grid operators’ stakes are so high that it 
always pays off for them to hire consultants, 
lawyers, and lobbyists to argue their case. To 
address these claims, the regulator needs to be 
equipped with a sufficient number of highly 
qualified employees.- Essential instruments to steer power sector development, like electricity pricing, remain 
under the authority of NDRC. The concentra-
tion of power within NDRC limits the ability 
of NEA to drive power sector reform.
Regulatory challenges in the area of policy 
setting and fundamental institutions- Efficient governance of the power sector is impeded by overlapping responsibilities 
and conflicts of interests between different 
government authorities.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 . Fig. 3.6 Key Actors of China’s Power Sector Governance, (© GIZ [29])
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- In international comparison, NEA is under-staffed, underfunded and without sufficient 
power to make independent decisions. The 
lack of independence and law enforcement 
authority has a negative effect on regulatory 
performance.- The concentration of power within NDRC limits the ability of NEA to drive power sec-
tor reform.
3.4.2 Market structure
The market structure and especially the involve-
ment of new market actors is a critical factor with 
regard to the innovation potential in the smart grid 
development process. The following paragraphs 
will describe the governance structures between the 
companies at the various stages of the supply chain 
(vertical market structure) and the competitive con-
ditions for the companies in each part of the supply 
chain (horizontal market structure).
Vertical market structure The competences and 
responsibilities of China’s power system supply 
chain have been tightly bundled over a long period 
of time. The main electricity sector reform of 2002 
mandated the separation (or unbundling) of the 
state-owned vertically integrated utility into five big 
power generation companies, two major grid opera-
tors handling transmission, distribution and retail 
as well as four power service corporations. 
All of them are SOE. Under this market struc-
ture, the grid operators are assigned regional mo-
nopolies acting as single buyers from generation 
side as well as being the only seller with the elec-
tricity retail monopoly within their geographic area.
Horizontal market structure In the field of power 
generation, the five major power generation com-
panies, the so-called Big Five are responsible for 
roughly 50 % of China’s electricity generation. By 
means of its project approval process, NDRC tries 
to balance generation capacities between them [31]. 
Due to their size, the Big Five have a significant lob-
bying force contributing to China’s power system 
governance together with the government and the 
grid operators. The remaining part of China’s power 
is generated by thousands of smaller local and re-
gional generation companies. In addition, there are 
specialized generation companies mainly focusing 
on power generation from one energy source, e. g. 
hydro or nuclear power. China’s power generation 
sector can be described as liberalized, as it poten-
tially allows competition between the different com-
panies. However, compared to local governments 
or state-owned companies, private and foreign in-
vestors still face significant legal and administrative 
barriers restricting the development of a diverse 
ownership structure [2].
Power transmission, distribution and retail are 
currently vertically integrated and operated by two 
major SOE with geographical monopolies includ-
ing electricity retail: SGCC controls the eastern, 
central, northwestern, northern and northeastern 
grids; while CSG is in charge of the southern grid. In 
the sparsely populated province of Inner Mongolia, 
an independent grid operator, the Inner Mongolia 
Electric Power Corporation, controls the western 
part of the grid while SGCC controls the eastern 
part. Due to their importance for the development 
of China’s power system, both SGCC and CSG are 
briefly introduced below:- State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), an SOE, is the 7th biggest company in the world 
according to the 2012 Fortune Global 500 list, 
with almost 1.6 million employees [32]. SGCC 
is responsible for power transmission, distri-
bution, and retail in all five major regions of 
China with the exception of South China. Its 
operations cover 26 provinces, autonomous re-
gions and municipalities – 88 % of the national 
territory – and 83 % of the national power 
consumption [33] (see . Table A.5 in the ap-
pendix for a list of affiliated grid operators). 
The company has ministry-like status and is 
a powerful force in power sector governance 
[34]. - China Southern Power Grid (CSG), also an SOE, ranks at position 152 on the Fortune 
Global 500 list and has roughly 300,000 em-
ployees. CSG is responsible for power trans-
mission, distribution, and retail in the five 
provinces of South China, covering 12 % of 
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the national territory and 17 % of the national 
power consumption [33].
Both grid operators are currently expanding their 
business portfolios across the value chain: SGCC 
has taken over domestic engineering firms and lead-
ing electric power equipment manufacturers, raising 
concerns about conflicts of interests and a threat to 
competition due to the concentration of multiple 
roles within one company (i. e. roles standard set-
ting, manufacturing equipment, transmitting and 
selling electricity). 
At the same time, SGCC is pursuing a “going 
global” strategy targeting the acquisition of assets 
abroad [35]. The advancing vertical integration of 
SGCC has caused discussion as to whether its merg-
ers and acquisitions go against China’s power sector 
reform policies of downsizing and unbundling grid 
operators. Recently a potential separation of grid 
operators into transmission and distribution com-
panies or into smaller, regional businesses has been 
subject of debate [34].
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of market structure- Transmission, distribution and retail of China’s electricity are in the hands of two 
grid operators. There is no competition in 
the power retail sector.- The acquisitions of grid operators in other segments of the value chain (e. g. equipment 
manufacturing and services) threaten fair 
competition in these sectors.- The size and power of grid operators makes it difficult to regulate them.
3.4.3 Market design and RES 
integration
The question regarding how electricity markets are 
designed is highly important for the development of 
smart grids because market design affects electric-
ity pricing. Pricing mechanisms, including feed-in 
tariffs for RES, are of crucial importance with regard 
to the utilization of different generation sources, 
investment decisions for new generation and grid 
capacities, day-to-day power consumption patterns, 
and investments in power saving technologies. 
General market design Prices for energy resources, 
power system equipment and electricity were fixed 
by the government for a long period of time. In the 
1980 s, the government started to gradually liber-
alize coal prices. Coal is currently at least partly 
traded at variable market prices, either depending 
on spot market rates or on individually negotiated 
contracts [31]. 
Irrespective of market liberalization tendencies, 
China still lacks a formal and transparent mecha-
nism for linking real costs and prices of electricity 
[12]. Electricity markets with prices based on supply 
and demand do not exist in China. Two types of 
electricity prices exist in China:- On-grid prices are the prices power generators receive from their grid operator for each kWh 
generated.- Retail prices are the prices grid operators (which are also responsible for retail) charge to 
end consumers for each kWh consumed.
Both prices are fixed by the price department of 
NDRC and adjusted every 18–24 months.7
Setting on-grid prices NDRC determines on-grid 
prices for power generation using two different ap-
proaches: - On-grid prices for thermal generators are set using a price benchmark for generators within 
the same technology class. Each power plant 
is contractually guaranteed a certain capacity 
factor (number of full load hours) equal to 
comparable facilities. The equal capacity factor 
is based on an estimate of annual power output 
as well as on average fixed and variable costs.- On-grid prices assigned to owners of hydro power and nuclear power plants differ from 
facility to facility. They are the sum of the 
7 Jointly with local and provincial price bureaus, the price 
department of NDRC is responsible for the formulation, 
inspection, approval and establishment of the tariff, as well 
as for the supervision and inspection of the tariff imple-
mentation. In addition to NDRC, the NEA may put forward 
suggestions to the price department of NDRC.
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plant’s generation costs, governmental taxes 
and surcharges, and profits attributed to the 
plant owner [2] [12]. 
To give a short overview of the results of these 
price-setting mechanisms, the following list shows 
on-grid prices for electricity stemming from differ-
ent conventional generation technologies in 2012 
(prices from [31]):- Gas-fired power plants: 0.395–0.710 RMB/kWh- Coal-fired power plants: 0.311–0.520 RMB/kWh- Nuclear power plants: 0.414–0.471 RMB/kWh- Hydro power plants: 0.145–0.411 RMB/kWh
Consequences of on-grid price setting Both price 
setting approaches ensure that plant operators usu-
ally earn revenues sufficient for the repayment of 
their investment costs within one decade [2]. That 
is, in principle, both approaches are sufficient to in-
centivize investments in power generation capaci-
ties. However, such price setting approaches based 
on costs are often viewed quite critically in the eco-
nomic literature (see e. g. [36], [37], and [38]): for 
example, they are quite time-consuming for the reg-
ulator. In China, the following aspects have to be em-
phasized with regard to the setting of on-grid prices: - Due to the fact that coal prices are flexible while on-grid electricity tariffs for coal-fired 
power plants are strictly regulated and adjusted 
rather infrequently, power companies are not 
able to directly pass on changes in fuel costs. 
During periods of high coal prices, power 
companies have seen their revenues squeezed 
to such an extent that they have restricted 
generation in order to limit their losses. This 
behavior further aggravates the problem of 
missing generation capacities and contributes 
to the emergence of power outages.- The approach used to set on-grid prices of hydro power and nuclear power plants gives 
few incentives to save costs, because potential 
cost savings in one specific power plant would 
lead to lower on-grid prices for the plant within 
18–24 months. Even more, such approaches 
give an incentive to exaggerate generation costs 
by means of creative financial accounting to 
receive higher on-grid prices [38].
Setting of retail prices Retail prices are amended 
from province to province to account for policy 
goals and status of economic development. They are 
also differentiated according to end user groups. The 
current national averages of electricity retail prices 
for different consumer groups are: - Commercial: 0.863 RMB/kWh,- Non-residential lighting: 0.791 RMB/kWh,- Industrial use: 0.698 RMB/kWh,- Residential: 0.498 RMB/kWh,- Agriculture: 0.419 RMB/kWh,- Irrigation in poor areas: 0.201 RMB/kWh.
Retail tariffs are subject to cross-subsidization in 
certain market segments to account for differences 
in income and to ensure social stability. Tariffs for 
residential, agriculture, irrigation and drainage use, 
together reflecting about 20 % of the Chinese power 
consumption, are lower than average generation 
costs. It is notable that industrial users generally pay 
higher tariffs than households. 
Consequences of retail price setting The main 
disadvantage of low retail prices is that a low price 
level does not incentivize consumers to use power 
more efficiently. There is evidence that residential 
electricity consumers in China are quite sensitive to 
changes in electricity price levels [39]. Thus, increas-
ing electricity prices would probably lead to signifi-
cant reductions of electricity consumption among 
Chinese households. However, increasing electricity 
prices for residential consumers is not a political op-
tion in China given the government’s intention to 
keep prices for residential consumers low. Therefore, 
China currently employs a number of other retail 
pricing policies that serve to align economic and 
environmental targets of the electricity sector [1]:- A three-tiered pricing system has been applied to residential consumers since mid-2012. Elec-
tricity prices are set in blocks with higher rates 
for customers with a large electricity consump-
tion (referred to as inclining block pricing).- In addition, China has implemented a policy differentiating the electricity tariffs based on 
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the energy efficiency of industrial processes. 
The policy, which is applied to eight energy-in-
tensive industries, aims at phasing out outdated 
industrial capacities or incentivizing upgrades.
Promotion and integration of RES Feed-in tariffs 
have proven to be an efficient instrument to pro-
mote RES in China. They are paid to RES genera-
tion installations depending on the type of renew-
able energy and location of the installations. Feed-in 
tariffs for RES generation are considerably higher 
than on-grid prices for hydro power and coal-fired 
power plants. In 2012, the ranges for feed-in tariffs 
of different RES generation types in 2012 were [31]:- Solar: 1.00 RMB/kWh- Biomass: 0.56–0.77 RMB/kWh- Wind: 0.51–0.61 RMB/kWh
The Renewable Energy Law obliges grid operators 
to feed in renewably generated electricity. The re-
sulting costs are socialized through a renewable 
energy surcharge levied on all electricity users in 
China [31].8 Since the initial publication of the 2006 
Renewable Energy Law, the renewable energy sur-
charge has been adjusted three times, with the last 
increase from 0.008 to 0.015 RMB/kWh taking place 
in September 2013. To ensure that the grid compa-
nies do not misuse the surcharge, it is turned over 
to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in a first step. The 
grid companies then apply to MOF and NEA for 
the disbursement of these funds with supporting 
documentation [40]. This procedure causes a delay 
in the reimbursement of grid operators’ expenses 
for purchasing power generated from renewables, 
which in turn results in a lack of operating capital 
with serious effects on the whole supply chain. Grid 
operators delay payments to wind power develop-
ers, who in turn are unable to pay renewable energy 
equipment manufacturers (e. g. wind turbines), re-
sulting in delayed payment of component suppliers. 
This situation is expected to be alleviated with the 
recent doubling of the renewable energy surcharge. 
From the grid operator’s perspective, delays in reim-
bursement may be seen as a reason to delay the grid 
connection of renewable energy generators.
8 Note that agricultural uses and power consumers in Tibet 
are excepted from the surcharge [43]. 
Regulatory challenges in the area of 
market design and RES integration- On-grid and retail electricity prices do not reflect actual costs and are adjusted only 
infrequently. - The approach used for setting on-grid prices of hydro and nuclear power plants gives 
only few incentives for cost savings. Rather 
it gives incentives to exaggerate costs to 
achieve a higher on-grid price.- Although a system of tiered prices has been introduced for residential consumers, the 
low overall level of retail electricity prices 
does not provide sufficient incentives for 
consumers to use power more efficiently.- Delays in the disbursement of RES funds leads to a lack of operating capital along the 
renewable energy value chain and provides 
a disincentive for grid operators to connect 
RES plants to the grid.
3.4.4 Development of infrastructure 
and network regulation
This section explains how grid planning is done 
in China and how investments in the (smart) grid 
infrastructure are incentivized. The pertinent regu-
latory practices directly impact the stable and af-
fordable operation of the current grid infrastructure 
and the investments in the prospective smart grid 
infrastructure.
Network expansion planning The government’s 
key target is cost-efficient extension and develop-
ment of the power grid in order to cope with the 
steadily increasing electricity consumption and 
minimize supply interruptions.
Targets on the development of grid infrastruc-
ture and grid operators’ performance are specified 
by the government in a top-down process. However, 
little information is publicly available on official grid 
expansion plans [41]. As a result, the document 
Framework and Roadmap for Strong and Smart Grid 
Standards, published by SGCC in 2010 [42], serves 
as an unofficial (smart) grid development plan in 
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China [41]. With respect to grid expansion plan-
ning, there is little guidance from the government 
and little coordination among existing power sys-
tem stakeholders. 
Network regulation At present, there is no ex-
plicit price for transmission and distribution (net-
work charge) based on actual costs. The source of 
grid operators’ income is the difference between 
the on-grid and the retail price for electricity. This 
amount covers all costs of the grid operators: grid 
operation and maintenance, grid upgrade and ex-
pansion, management, metering and billing, etc. 
The remainder makes up the profits of the grid op-
erator. The government targets a rate-of-return for 
the grid operators in the range of about 8 to 10 % 
[43]. This practice, in combination with the rather 
infrequent adjustments of the retail electricity tar-
iffs, has an impact on the ability of grid companies 
to quickly and predictably recoup costs. In turn, 
the grid companies may exhibit little motivation to 
invest and assume costs related to the implementa-
tion of government policies and regulations, e. g. for 
investments related to renewable grid connection 
and integration, investments in end-use energy ef-
ficiency or distributed generation [1]. Moreover, 
the cost structure of power sector companies lacks 
transparency and power sector data and informa-
tion available to the public is very limited. Opaque 
costs affect the government’s ability to regulate and 
inform the setting of electricity prices.
There are no clear rules for accounting of costs, 
revenues, and profits and no transparent adminis-
trative process for setting allowed revenues. Without 
this foundation the government is unable to audit 
companies’ accounting records or exact penalties for 
noncompliance with reporting obligations, informa-
tion requests or other government requirements [1].
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of development of infrastructure 
and network regulation- Grid expansion planning is organized in a top-down process with low transparency 
and little involvement of players other than 
government authorities and grid operators.
- The price-setting mechanism with respect to wholesale and retail prices together with the 
rather infrequent adjustments of retail prices 
reduces the ability of grid companies to 
quickly recoup costs. This might reduce their 
willingness to incur costs related to other 
government policies (for instance related to 
RES integration).- A lack of transparency of costs impedes the efficient and informed regulation of power 
sector companies.
3.4.5 Coordination of generation 
and consumption
The following paragraphs describe general respon-
sibilities for coordinating electricity generation and 
consumption. Government measures implemented 
in this context are also presented.
Long-term coordination of generation and con-
sumption China’s rapid economic growth has 
resulted in a steadily increasing electricity con-
sumption. The Chinese government promotes the 
expansion of generation and grid capacities. In 
addition, the role of energy efficiency as an instru-
ment to decouple the rise of power consumption 
from economic growth has been recognized. Nu-
merous policies to promote energy efficiency have 
been promulgated: for instance, national targets for 
energy intensity, differential pricing for energy-in-
tensive industries and energy efficiency obligations 
requiring Chinese grid companies to realize energy 
conservation targets (e. g. through end-user energy 
efficiency programs).
Short-term coordination of generation Histori-
cally, dispatch of power plants in China is orga-
nized by means of a so-called equal shares dispatch 
or generation quota system. China allocates oper-
ating hours equally among the coal-fired genera-
tors that constitute the bulk of China’s generating 
capacity. This system is intended to give each gen-
erator an equal chance to recover capital costs and 
achieve a reasonable return-on-investment, but it 
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largely ignores the fact that plants within the coal 
fleet vary significantly in terms of efficiency and 
environmental performance [44]. Annual operat-
ing hours for generators are set administratively 
by Provincial Economic and Trade Commissions 
(PETC) and approved nationally by NDRC. As a 
result, the overall performance of the power sys-
tem has suffered significantly in terms of cost, 
environmental performance, and distorted invest-
ment decisions. The dependence of each coal-fired 
generator on running a similar guaranteed number 
of hours has become a major barrier to reforming 
dispatch in China.
In 2007, China started to pilot a so-called energy 
efficient dispatch system. This system sets a dispatch 
order prioritizing generators on the basis of heat and 
emissions rates favoring renewable and low carbon 
generation sources, with coal-fired power plants dis-
patched according to their thermal efficiency. This 
order is based on the priority order table created by 
PETC and is updated quarterly based on changes in 
generator parameters and the addition of new units 
[45]. Hence, the power generation quotas of power 
generation facilities are no longer guaranteed [46]. 
Since on-grid prices are calculated on the basis of a 
fixed estimate of annual operating hours, genera-
tors will face a revenue shortfall if average operat-
ing hours fall below the projected level [44]. One 
of the main drawbacks of the policy was a lack of 
compensation of power and grid companies for lost 
revenues due to the changes in dispatch. The pilot 
has proved to be difficult to implement and has not 
spread to the whole country [47].
Regardless of whether a generation quota or an 
energy-efficient dispatch system is used, the specific 
day-to-day dispatching is in the hand of dispatch 
centers under the authority of national, regional, 
provincial, or local grid companies. The dispatch 
centers take into account factors like load forecasts, 
the availability of power plants, and constraints for 
system reliability. On this basis, the dispatch cen-
ters set day-ahead commitment plans for the power 
plants. Power generation companies are subse-
quently obliged to supply power as required [44].
Short-term coordination of consumption Like 
in all other regions of the world, China’s intraday 
power generation follows intraday power demand. 
However, early attempts have been made to influ-
ence the hourly pattern of China’s power consump-
tion and to shift power consumption from peak 
times to off-peak times: since the 1990 s, many prov-
inces have started to coordinate power consump-
tion by means of interruptible loads and time-of-use 
prices:- Interruptible loads refer to a pricing mecha-nism in which large industrial consumers are 
paid for curtailing their loads in times of net-
work congestions. This demand response (DR) 
mechanism has been piloted and regionally 
applied in China [12].- Time-of-use pricing means that the electric-ity price varies depending on the time-of-day 
when electricity is provided. In times of net-
work congestions prices tend to be high to in-
centivize electricity consumers to reduce their 
consumption. With the 2005 Interim Provisions 
for the Administration of Power Selling Prices, 
the Chinese government stressed the role of 
time-of-use prices to reflect real costs at dif-
ferent day times [2]. Time-of-use pricing has 
been implemented mainly for industrial and 
commercial users [48]. In some regions, time-
of-use pricing is also applied to residential cus-
tomers. The Chinese government has recently 
announced that it will introduce time-of-use 
pricing for residential consumers on a national 
level by the end of 2015 [49]. Overall, it is still 
questionable whether the existing incentives 
are actually sufficient to induce customers to 
shift electricity consumption to off-peak times 
[2]. 
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of coordination of generation 
and consumption- The generation quota system ignores the fact that power plants within the coal fleet 
vary significantly in terms of efficiency and 
environmental performance. As a result, 
the overall performance of the system 
has suffered significantly in terms of cost, 
environmental performance and distorted 
investment decisions.
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- The dispatch model is closely linked to the electricity pricing mechanism; no dispatch 
reform can be introduced without a reform 
of electricity pricing, and such a reform 
would have to compensate coal power 
plants whose revenue is calculated on the 
basis of the existing dispatch model. - China has made remarkable progress with re-gard to the introduction of time-of-use pric-
ing. Such pricing mechanisms are planned 
to be applied to all categories of customers 
in 2015. However, it is unclear whether the 
specific design of time-of-use prices actually 
sets sufficient incentives for shifting electric-
ity use among all groups of customers. 
3.4.6 The role of information 
and communication
The government’s role in promoting smart grid-
related ICT The Chinese government promotes in-
novations surrounding smart grids mainly by focus-
ing on the supply of smart grid technologies: on the 
one hand, the Chinese government counts on public 
enterprises as main drivers of smart grid innova-
tions. On the other hand, it allocates significant fi-
nancial funds to promote R&D activities or to build 
up demonstration sites [50]. Specifically, in 2012 the 
MOST released a special plan for smart grids fo-
cusing on R&D and considering the 12th five-year 
period (from 2011 to 2015). The smart grid special 
plan focuses on three main strategic goals:- It is forward-looking and sets the agenda for the Chinese smart grid development after 
2015. It promotes the development of so-called 
cutting-edge smart grid technologies which 
might be deployed after 2015.- It aims at ensuring that existing modern tech-nologies such as those listed in appendix B are 
introduced very fast into the Chinese energy 
system.- It highlights that China must keep up with world-class smart grid research developments 
and should carry out cutting-edge smart grid 
technology research.
The general idea behind the smart grid special plan 
is that the development of smart grids should be 
business-orientated and primarily rely on the inno-
vation capacity of domestic companies, which are 
intended to achieve international technical domi-
nance by 2020. This will require a more profound 
and more effective involvement in international re-
search cooperation and standardization processes.
The promotion of smart grid standards is an-
other important channel for the government to in-
fluence the evolution of Chinese smart grids. One 
example for such activities is the work of the State 
Council, which has issued a plan for modifying and 
promoting the power equipment manufacturing in-
dustry [50]. Another example is the China Electric 
Power Research Institute directly emitting standards 
on Low Voltage Power Line Carrier Communication 
or Intelligent Control Network Data Terminal [50]. 
Policies focusing on the demand for smart grid 
technologies are of rather low importance for the 
Chinese government in its efforts to promote smart 
grids [50]. Note that this prevalence of supply-side 
policies together with the rather low importance of 
demand-side policies in China are a sign that, much 
like the situation in other countries, China’s smart 
grid industry is still in the initial phase of its devel-
opment [50].
The role of the ICT industry in promoting smart 
grids China’s ICT sector is representative of the 
massive changes in China’s industry and economy. 
Since the economic reforms in 1978, it has been 
growing rapidly with large inward and outward 
foreign direct investment flows and export-led ac-
tivities [51]. Today, most of China’s ICT companies 
are private companies that are not owned by the 
state. Many of them have been founded by foreign 
investors or companies. The Chinese strategy of 
building national champions has already yielded 
the creation of several ambitious companies which 
became global players [51]: Huawei Technologies, 
Lenovo, and ZTE are good examples of such com-
panies. Huawei and ZTE are major players in the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Optical and 
Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM) 
equipment markets. Huawei Technologies in par-
ticular has emerged as a leading provider of tele-
Chapter 3 • China’s way from conventional power grids towards smart grids40
communications networks that increasingly chal-
lenges established competitors like Siemens, Cisco, 
and Alcatel [51].
Irrespective of the increasing importance of 
China’s ICT sector, most ICT companies have few 
stakes in the strategic development of China’s smart 
grid vision. Even though these companies act as 
component and technology suppliers, they are less 
engaged in the strategic development process, which 
is mainly pushed forward by the government, the 
grid companies, and the power generation compa-
nies.9 
Regulatory challenges in the area of the 
role of information and communication- There is a need for cutting-edge smart grid technology research to keep up with inter-
national level smart grid research develop-
ments. - China’s ICT industry consists of many ambi-tious and competitive companies, some of 
them global players. However, ICT industry is 
currently underrepresented in the strategic 
development of smart grids in China. There-
fore, the large innovation potential of the ICT 
sector risks not being fully integrated in the 
Chinese smart grid development. 
Key findings- In the past 15 years, a series of reforms have greatly improved the efficiency, reliability, and environ-
mental performance of the Chinese power sector. 
However, significant challenges remain: rapidly 
rising electricity demand, concerns about power 
system reliability and energy security, low average 
utilization rates of the grid infrastructure, environ-
mental degradation and climate change.- A core motivation for smart grids in China is their suspected positive impact on supply security and 
operational efficiency, especially on the distribu-
tion grid level. Peak shaving enabled by means of 
9 They seem to show even less engagement in China’s smart 
grid development than international players such as Cisco 
or IBM.
smart grid technologies plays an important role 
to increase supply security and operational effi-
ciency. Smart grid technologies are also seen as 
a means to reduce RES integration costs, which is 
of critical importance given the Chinese govern-
ment’s aggressive RES expansion targets.- Due to the absence of a common smart grid view in China and the contrary strategies on smart grid 
development among China’s grid operators, there 
is still no unanimously accepted technological and 
organizational concept of smart grids in China. As 
a result, the uncertainty of potential smart grid 
investors regarding the future technological de-
velopment is high.- Some regulatory aspects of China’s electric power system represent barriers for the effective and ef-
ficient development of smart grids in China:
– The absence of government guidelines for the 
long-term development of the electric power 
sector, overlapping responsibilities and conflicts 
of interests between different government au-
thorities, and the lack of independence and law 
enforcement of the regulatory authority point 
to insufficient government leadership with re-
gard to smart grid development. 
– The market structure is dominated by China’s 
grid operators, who are responsible for transmis-
sion, distribution, and retail. Innovative and new 
market actors, and specifically the ICT industry, 
are hardly involved in the smart grid develop-
ment process.
– On-grid prices, retail prices, and the operating 
hours of power plants are fixed by government 
authorities. Grid operators’ income depends on 
the difference between retail and on-grid prices 
– network charges are not explicitly calculated. 
Such a market design sets only few incentives 
for operational efficiency and does not incentiv-
ize investments in an efficient way. 
– Grid expansion planning is organized in a top-
down process with low transparency and little 
involvement of players other than government 
authorities and grid operators.
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